Southern Illinois University Carbondale

OpenSIUC
Working Papers

Political Networks Paper Archive

Winter 2012

Gender, Social Networks, and Voting Behavior
Scott D. McClurg
Southern Illinois University, mcclurg@siu.edu

Michelle L. Wade
Northwest Missouri State University, mwade@nwmissouri.edu

Maja V. Wright-Phillips
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, majavw@siu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pn_wp
Recommended Citation
McClurg, Scott D.; Wade, Michelle L.; and Wright-Phillips, Maja V., "Gender, Social Networks, and Voting Behavior" (2012). Working
Papers. Paper 64.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pn_wp/64

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Networks Paper Archive at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Working Papers by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.

Gender, Social Networks and Voting Behavior

Scott D. McClurg *
Michelle L. Wade #
Maja V. Wright-Phillips ^

February 13, 2012

* mcclurg@siu.edu, Associate Professor, Departments of Political Science and
Sociology, Southern Illinois University, Mailcode 4501, Carbondale, IL 62901
#

mwade@nwmissouri.edu, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Humanities,
Philosophy and Political Science, Northwest Missouri State University, 800 University
Drive, Maryville, MO 64468
^

majavw@siu.edu, Doctoral Candidate, Departments of Political Science, Southern
Illinois University, Mailcode 4501, Carbondale, IL 62901

1

Gender, Social Networks and Voting Behavior
This paper examines how interpersonal social networks help explain the voting behavior
of men and women. We argue that the gender gap in voting is influenced by the partisan
and gender composition of networks, rather than just the latter. Building on this
foundation, we explain how gendering in network construction and impact helps create a
cleavage between men and women even under conditions that are often close to "random
mixing." Analysis of the 2000 American National Election Study shows the voting gap is
related to men excluding women from political networks, men being less exposed to
females who support Democrats, and men being more strongly influence by women who
support Republicans. The principal conclusion of the paper is that the role of social
networks in explaining gendered voting is a function of combined partisan and gender
segregation, principally by men.
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There appear to be three ways in which social relations contribute
to the maintenance of political differences.
First…it is necessary to have a social basis for a political interest.
It would be difficult in contemporary America, for example, to maintain
voting differences by sex, because there are few policy issues persisting
over a period of time that affect men and women differently.…
Second, a necessary condition for the persistence of political
differences is their transmission to succeeding generations.…
Finally, given the origin of a voting difference in one generation
and the transmittibility of it to the next, another condition is
necessary…[m]embers of the social groups involved must be substantially
more in contact with one another, socially and physically, than they are
with opposing groups.
Berelson et al., 1954, p. 74
This epigraph from Voting is a definitive statement on how social cleavages
become politically significant. Although very few scholars directly challenge the
Columbia researchers’ theoretical claims, their example of “voting differences by sex” is
striking in light of the gender voting gap that emerged in the last three decades of
American politics (Ford 2006; Howell and Day 2000; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Wirls
1986). There is evidence that gender differences exist on policy (e.g., BoxSteffensmeier, et al. 2004) and that there is intergenerational socialization (e.g, Jenkins
n.d.), satisfying two of the theoretical conditions for a political condition. However, the
evidence suggesting that men and women have socially segregated interactions -- that
there is "a social basis for a political interest" -- is less clear.
There is some social segregation between men and women in social institutions,
particularly as it pertains to politics (Burns et al. 2001; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995;
Walsh 2004) and in specific institutional settings like the work place (McPhereson et al.
2001). Yet in relation to well-documented social homophily along racial and ethnic lines,
gender differences in social interaction are relatively small (McPhereson et al. 2001).
Social institutions like the Catholic Church and labor unions nevertheless provide more
1

opportunity for social segregation along religious and economic lines than do the social
institutions that regulate social interaction between men and women. And while it is
clear that barriers to gender equality still exist in contemporary America, expanded
economic and social opportunities for women may have increased opportunities for
cross-gender social contacts in social institutions at a time when the gender gap has
emerged more clearly as a significant cleavage.
Yet despite this fact, there is a politically meaningful cleavage between the
partisan behavior of men and women. This challenges the received wisdom about how
social cleavages become politically meaningful and leads us to ask how does social
interaction contribute – if at all – to gendered voting in American elections. We address
this question by examining the relationship between gender, political preference, and
social communication. Our analysis is guided by both traditional network explanations
for voting behavior as well as the possibility of gendered social processes. Using survey
data from the 2000 National Election Study, we find that there is a clear divide between
the political networks of men and women that is related to partisanship and gender.
Although women have a notable level of gender equality in their interactions, men are far
more likely to only include men into political discussion. This segregation has
consequences for the partisan signals respondents receive, with less political homophily
in women’s networks and men more likely to discount the impact of women in their
evaluations.
Our results build on arguments about both social influence and gendered voting.
Regarding the former, they suggest that the condition of social and physical separation is
not necessary for the formation of cleavages. Although more stringent divisions may be
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more politically potent, we should not overlook the power of less noticeable forms of
segregation in the structure of discussion networks. In this case, the evidence suggests
that political homophily among men and their discounting of women’s opinions is
sufficient support for gendered voting even when women do not exhibit the same
characteritics. With respect to gendered voting, the results support an interpretation that
the gap is driven by men changing their behavior rather than women coalescing together.
While our data do not allow us to study dynamics underlying gendered voting, they
illuminate a model for understanding those dynamics. Importantly, this model suggests
that policy concerns shared by women will continue to be under-represented as men are
more unified behind particular candidates and issues.
The Puzzle of Gendered Voting in a World Not Segregated by Gender
Explanations of the gender gap largely focus on the impact of political issues and
opinions on male and female vote choice (Conover and Sapiro 1993). Research shows
significant differences between men and women on “compassion issues,” such as social
welfare and racial equality, and on issues of war or violence (Norris 2003, 156). On
domestic policy, women tend to be supportive of helping the disadvantaged (Cook and
Wilcox 1991, 1111), creating jobs, reducing unemployment, providing government
services (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004, 516), and environmental regulation (Howell and
Day 2000). Women show less support than men on defense spending (Wirls 1986, 319).
Women are also more likely to oppose capital punishment and the use of force in
domestic law enforcement (Howell and Day 2000). Ironically, there appear to be few
gender differences on opinions regarding (but not salience of) “women’s issues” such as
abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (Box-Steffensmeier el al. 2004, 16; Norris

3

2003, 156). In addition to addressing which issues drive the gender gap, this research
tries to determine whether it is the difference of opinion on issues or the salience of those
issues that is the primary determinant of gendered voting (Chaney et al. 1998).
While significantly advancing our understanding of gendered voting, this
literature does not consider how these differences are buttressed by social relations. As
Berelson and his colleagues recognized, not all social cleavages are politically-relevant,
and among those that are, there must be some social mechanism that sustains them. From
their perspective, political fault lines depend in large part on levels of contact within and
between groups. As levels of within-group contact increase and between-group contact
decrease, they expected the political significance of a social cleavage to become more
politically important. As noted above, the problem of applying this argument to the
gender gap in voting is that there are ample opportunities for men and women to interact.
To be sure, men and women are not on equal ground when they interact with each
other. Men are less likely to identify women as political discussants than women are to
identify men (Klofstad et al. 2006; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Women are less
inclined to offer political opinions to others – i.e., political proselytizing – than are men,
except when women candidates run (Hansen 1997). And men tend to see women as less
knowledgeable about politics, potentially degrading social influence across gender lines
(Mendez and Osborn 2010; Mondak and Anderson 2004; Huckfeldt 2001). Nevertheless,
gender does not on the surface appear to be as important in producing segregation in
social interaction than other factors such partisanship (MacKuen 1992; Finifter 1974),
religion (Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993), class (Marsden 1997), and other factors.
This is because these other differences overlap with social institutions (such as parties,
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churches, and unions) that buttress within-group relations. The one social institution
most apt to affect gender gaps – marriage – works to bring their preferences and behavior
together.
Altogether this presents a series of questions about the role of social networks and
gender in voting. Is gendered voting related to men and women’s social networks? If so,
what process links social networks to voting? Is it a function of differences in the gender
or partisan composition of the networks? Or, is a function of men and women being
differently affected by the discussion partners?
Social Network Models and Gendered Voting
The Baseline Argument About Social Networks and Voting
In what ways might interaction in social networks be related to gendered voting in
American elections? One possibility – which we consider the null hypothesis – is that
gendered voting has nothing to do with social interaction between the sexes. If that is the
case, it implies that the political differences of men and women might arise naturally
from socialization differences between men and women (Gilligan 1982) or from their
different socioeconomic circumstances (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004). Since men
and women are not socially isolated in the U.S., this implies that social influence does not
occur – or occur as strongly – across the sexes. Even if men and women interact and
exchange political information, the idea is that gender is unrelated to the content of those
interactions and their impact on political behavior. People are responsive to political
information provided by members of their network, regardless of their gender and that of
their discussants. If this is the case, we should find that the influence of one person upon
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the voting behavior of another might be dependent on their network, but that process does
not differ by the gender of the respondent or its distribution in the network.
Toward that end, we have two hypotheses derived from the social network
literature. The first expectation is that a respondent’s candidate preference is likely to
mirror those of her discussants, regardless of the gender of the respondent or her
discussants. When we examine discussant pairs, we expect that the level of political
homophily is the same across the possible pairings of male and female
respondents/discussants. A second hypothesis is that the influence of any particular
network discussant is dependent on the rest of the network (Huckfeldt et al. 2004), a
simple version of a network structure effect. As with the first hypothesis, the expectation
is that this process is independent of the gender composition of the network and the
respondent. These expectations, and others derived below, are displayed in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Gender, Network Composition, and Voting
In contrast to this baseline network argument, gender identity might lead to
gendered voting through social networks. One possibility focuses on what we will call
composition effects. Underneath the social logic of voting is a focus on the
communication of political information. As the network becomes more biased toward
one political choice over another, we expect that this is communicated to voters, and they
feel pressure to conform to their network. To the degree that there are significant
differences in the networks of men and women, especially in ways that are politically
relevant, we should expect a voting gap to emerge.
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There are two possible ways that this might happen. First, men and women might
exhibit partisan differences in their network. Since there is a partisan gender gap – with
men being more Republican than women – we might find men and women have
discussion networks that are more reflective of the parties they support. Note that the
political composition of the network might be unrelated to gender in this case, especially
after accounting for a person’s partisanship. The implication is that a correlation exists
between individual partisanship and network partisanship that is not contingent on
respondent or network gender, but that is relevant to their voting behavior.
Yet the partisan balance of a network might also be a function of the gender of an
individual and his or her discussion partners. For the reasons outlined by Berelson and
his colleagues, we might expect stark political and social segregation in order for
networks to produce a gender voting gap. But some segregation on those lines may be
enough to produce an effect on voting. Indeed, previous research shows that despite
increasing equality among men and women in work life, substantial differences exist
among the sexes in terms of their access to professional advancement (Applebaum et al..
2004), home responsibilities (Mezey 1978; Sapiro 1982), and types of organizational
involvement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).
A consequence of such differences is that men and women may be exposed to
different opportunities for building networks that are related to these gendered processes.
These, in turn, may create differential access to political information that is a function of
both partisanship and gender. In particular, the notion is that women who have female
discussion partners are more likely to be even more pro-Democratic. The logic of this is
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that because women share both a partisan and gender identity, that they would be even
more likely to support Democrats.
Gender, Network Structure, and Voting
Social influences on political behavior also depend on the clarity with which
political information is communicated within networks, something that is dependent on
how social interactions fits with other exchanges in a person's interpersonal networks
(e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Though the clarity with which people perceive the political
content in social relations is not independent of network composition and structure,
neither is it entirely dependent on them. In particular, the clarity of information
communicated between people is related to each discussant's position in the network.
This is, of course, a process that could be gendered.
Along these lines, previous research (Huckfeldt, Brickell, and Sprague 1995,
Chapter 10; Mendez and Osborn 2010) demonstrates a strong asymmetry in how political
information flows between men and women. In particular, women are less likely to be
named as political discussants by men, and men perceive women to be less
knowledgeable about politics. To the extent that social influence depends on how clearly
political information flows across networks, this research implies that the impact of a
network on political behavior may differ in cross-gender dyads. Specifically, men should
be less susceptible to influence from women because women are generally perceived as
less important politically. Stated differently, men will discount information from women
because they are seen as being less informed on political matters. Because of the
asymmetry in these communication patterns, however, women should not exhibit the
same sensitivity to the gender distribution of the network.
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As Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) demonstrate, survey respondents are
more likely to accurately identify their discussant’s political preferences when those
preferences are shared by a majority of the remaining network. An implication of their
argument is that, in determining how to vote, the influence of any one discussion partner
depends on the cues provided by the rest of the network. We focus on the possibility that
men and women might rely differently on these elements of the network as a function of
the discussant’s gender. In particular, men might be less influenced by a single
discussant and more affected by the residual network when that discussant is a woman,
and vice versa.
Data
To explore these hypotheses, we use data from the 2000 American National
Election Study (ANES). In addition to the traditional questions the ANES includes for
studying voting behavior, it solicits information on each respondent’s social network.
Toward this end, respondents were asked for up to four names of the people with whom
they talk politics.1 Respondents reported how they knew each discussant, how frequently
they discussed politics, their perception of the discussant’s political knowledge, and their
perception of the discussant’s vote choice.2 We analyze these data in two ways. First,
we examine the whole networks of men and women. For these analyses, the data are
organized with the respondent as the unit of analysis and information on the network
dispersed across columns. Second, we examine network dyads in order to get a handle
on how specific discussants – and their political and gender characteristics – affect the

1

Although this “political matters” generator seemingly taps only political networks, there are very few
differences in the information provided in these scenarios when compared to the more general “most
important matters” name generator (Burt 1985) used by sociologists (Klofstad et al. 2006).
2
Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics are provided in Table A and B in the Appendix.
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respondent’s behavior. In these situations, the data are organized by respondentdiscussant dyads. Because this over-represents respondents with larger social networks,
we employ the procedure used by Huckfeldt et al. (2004) to correct for what they label
social autoregression.3
In addition to including information on social networks, the primary advantage of
the 2000 ANES data is that they come from a random sample of national respondents.
Although there are other surveys that include more extensive measures of social influence
measures (e.g., the 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study), they are based in one or two
communities. Although the gender gap undoubtedly exists in all manner of communities,
those manifestations may be affected by a wide variety of factors that are difficult to
control, such as female office holders or different norms toward the treatment of women.
There are two primary drawbacks to our data. First, the absence of interviews for
a random sample of named discussants limits our analysis to respondent perceptions of
network interaction. Because respondent perceptions of a discussant’s vote preference
depend upon both respondent partisanship and the distribution of voter preferences in the
rest of the network (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004), these data may understate
levels of disagreement in networks and reflect reciprocal influence of the respondents on
their network. On a related note, men and women may have notably different perceptions
of the politics of their network partners. Second, we are unable to account for the
influence of factors specific to the 2000 election that might influence the distribution of
political preferences across networks or between men and women. In both cases, these

3

The procedure is straightforward – we employ robust standard errors within respondent clusters and
control for other aspect of the network outside of the particular discussant. See Huckfeldt, Johnson, and
Sprague (2004) for additional details.
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limits restrict our ability to make strong claims about causality, especially beyond this
particular election.
Political Composition of Networks: The Impact of Gender and Political Preference
Female and Male Networks
We begin by examining the social networks of men and women. In Panel A of
Table 1, we see that among all respondents, there are significant differences between men
and women in regards to the size of their political networks, the average level of political
discussion, the average level of support for Bush, the number of women in a network, and
the intimacy in the network. Women are less likely to report having a political network
than men and engage in less political discussion in their networks than men. Support for
Bush also varies, with men showing more support for Bush than women. There are no
differences in the proportion of Gore discussants in male and female networks. Female
respondents are also more likely to report having higher numbers of women in their
networks and more intimate networks -- meaning more family members -- than men.
[Table 1 about here]
When we compare only those men and women who can identify at least one
discussant in Panel B of Table 1, we find that many of these differences disappear. This
is surprising in light of research suggesting sex is not a predictor of social isolation
(McPhereson et al. 2006). Yet, for example, the frequency of political discussion does
not differ significantly for men and women. Differences in levels of support for Bush are
also statistically insignificant. We do find that men still have larger political networks
than women -- consistent with the research of McPhereson et al. 2006 -- remain less
likely to include women in their networks, and report networks with lower levels of
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intimacy than women. Interestingly, once women report having a political network, the
average level of network political knowledge increases to a mean level of 1.29, while
men’s levels increase to 1.23. Notably we do not find women opting into all Democratic
networks or men opting into all Republican networks, evidence that in the aggregate
women and men are not sorting into partisan enclaves that would likely exist in religious
and/or ethnic groups.
In broad strokes, this evidence sheds some light on our different hypotheses. It
does not support the hypothesis that respondent gender is strongly related to the political
signals received by men and women from their whole network, especially once we
account for the lower propensity of women to name one or more discussants. On the
other hand, these data show that there are strong and persistent gender differences in the
people included by men and women in their networks. Since men are less likely to
include women in their networks and women are more likely on average to be
Democratic partisans than are males, this suggests that gender sorting in the selection of
networks may lead to voting differences between men and women. However, as noted
above, this is relationship is not so strong as to clearly account for the gender voting gap.
Political Cues Provided by Men and Women
We begin examining this possibility further by looking at levels of political
agreement in vote choice between respondents and discussants broken down by gender.
In Table 2, the most striking finding is that the highest levels of agreement in vote choice
are between male respondents and male discussants who voted for Bush. Among male
respondents with a male discussant, 52.7% voted for Bush indicating the highest levels of
agreement between a respondent and a discussant are when both are male and Bush
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supporters. In comparison, only 38.7% of male respondents’ female discussants voted
for Bush. A similar gender-partisan polarization occurs for female respondents. Among
female respondents, we see that 47.6% of female discussants voted for Gore in
comparison to 36.1% of male discussants. But what is different for women respondents
is that their male discussants are not as ardently pro-Bush as they are with male
respondents. This difference is attributable to female respondents reporting that male
discussants have either “no” preference or support some “other” candidate.
[Table 2 about here]
Overall, this evidence shows gender homophily is related to partisan homophily;
the gender composition of the network overlaps with the respondent’s partisan cues.
Because women have more females in their network and their male discussants are less
likely to support Bush, our female respondents are exposed to more pro-Gore information
than pro-Bush information. Interestingly, the political cues men receive are different,
both because their male discussants are more supportive of Bush and because their
networks are four times as likely to include other men. This is evidence of a
straightforward composition effect, but also with gendering in balance of partisan cues
and their strength. And most important for our purposes, it suggests that this imbalance
in the information men and women glean from their network is only evident we when
account for both gender and politics.
Table 3 takes the analysis one step further by examining discussant vote choice
according to respondent vote choice and gender of both discussants and respondents (a
dyad-level analysis). Among male respondents who voted for Gore, 77.7% of their
female discussants also voted for Gore, compared to 61.8% of male discussants. Among
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male respondents who voted for Bush, 72.2% of their female discussants also voted for
Bush, compared to 73.6% of male discussants. This high level of agreement with both
female and male discussants implies that male Bush supporters are highly discriminating
about the women they let into their political networks. We also see that among female
respondents who voted for Gore, 57.6% of male discussants also voted for Gore,
compared to 66.7% of female discussants. Among female respondents who voted for
Bush, 75.3% of male discussants also voted for Bush, compared to 67.6% of female
discussants. Thus, female respondents who support Bush have more variation in their
networks than their male counterparts.
Altogether these results suggest that gender may be functioning as a cue for
agreement in political networks. For men, the level of support in the network is
somewhat dependent upon gender. In fact, women may be serving as a cue for
Democratic men, and men may be serving as a cue for Republican men. For women,
though, it does not appear to make as much of a difference if the discussant is a man or
woman. Again, the failure of men to include women in their networks has consequences
for the political messages that they receive from their networks, generally pushing them
in the direction of the Republican party.
In terms of Bereslon et al.’s conditions for a social cleavage, there is evidence of
“random mixing” for females – women respondents talk to both men and women and get
exposed to both Republican and Democratic messages. But the story is different for male
respondents, who demonstrate evidence of segregation in that they are more likely to talk
to men and those men are more strongly Republican. This effect is less related to the
respondent’s gender than it is to his or her own political leanings and the discussant’s
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gender. In a phrase, it seems that men are more choosy about whom they talk to about
politics.
Partisanship, Network Gender, and Network Political Composition
The previous analysis shows that the composition of discussion networks is
gendered. In relation to our hypotheses, this suggests that a standard network framework
does not apply – partisanship is not the only factor in understanding the political
composition of networks. Instead, it is the interaction between the discussant’s gender
and the respondent’s political predilections. This occurs partly because gender overlaps
with political preferences, allowing both men and women the ability to use it as a signal
in identifying disagreeable network partners. At the same time, the fact that men are
generally more resistant toward including women in their networks implies that when
they do talk to women, they are more aware of potential political differences and only
include them when they are agreeable discussants. In other words, discussant gender,
might serve as a cue that activates partisanship and/or preference as a criterion for
inclusion in the network.
To explore this idea further, we regressed the percent of a respondent’s network
support for Gore and Bush on respondent partisanship, the proportion of women in the
network, and an interaction between the two. Individual level controls were added for
education, age, union membership, marital status, and respondent gender, the last of
which was also interacted with the network gender. Since people with larger political
networks have more opportunities for exposure to disagreement, we control for the size
of the network (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2001). The results are reported in
Table 4.
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[Table 4 about here]
Most interesting for our purposes is that the political content of respondent
networks is a function of gender, partisanship, and the gender of the network. As
interpreting these results is not straightforward just by looking about the statistical results
(Friederich 1982), we plot the different combinations in Figure 2. The larger dots on
each line represent the impact of network gender based on either gender (on the left hand
side) or partisanship (on the right hand side) for how much of the network supports Bush
and Gore. The small dots on either side of this estimate are the lower and upper
boundaries of the confidence interval for the coefficient.
[Figure 2 about here]
Consider first the impact of network gender on the amount of Bush and Gore
support for men and women. The most important differences here seem to be driven
more by whether we're examining Bush network support versus Gore rather than the sex
of the respondent.4 In the model for Bush, the confidence intervals of men and women
overlap with each other, suggest that there is not much difference in how they react to
women in their network. That said, the coefficient for women is statistically significant
at the .05 level and having more women in the network does make them more favorable
to Bush. When looking at support for Gore in the network, we again see that differences
between men and women are not stark. However, in this case both are likely to have
more Gore supporters in their network if there are more women in their network.
4

Although respondent gender was unrelated to the political composition of the network – ruling out the
possibility that it is the primary source of differential gender cues – we re-estimated our models separately
for men and women to allow for possible heterogeneity in how these processes operate. The results are
similar to what are reported in Table 4 with a handful of exceptions. First, the effect of network gender on
Bush support is statistically significant and positive for women, but remains statistically insignificant for
men. Second, both the direct effect of network gender (.34 for men and .26 for women) and its interaction
with partisanship on the composition of Gore vote is larger for men than women (0.10 and 0.07,
respectively). The results are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.
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Overall, it seems that increased gender homophily is related to more clarity in women's
networks in the sense that there is more support for both candidates (though much more
for Gore). For men, having more women in their network makes the network
significantly more pro-Gore.
Stronger still is the interaction of network gender and individual partisanship.
Considering the results for average percent of the network supporting Bush, the graph
shows that Republicans end up in more Bush-supporting networks but that independents’
and Democrats’ networks actually become less pro-Bush. Conversely, having more
women in a network ends up making it comprised of a greater proportion of Gore
supporters for everyone regardless of their political preferences.
[Figure 3 about here]
To see how this plays out, we display the impact of these variables on the political
composition of networks in Figure 3. For purposes of this simulation, we computed the
effects of these variables against a baseline respondent who was male, had a high school
education, was married, not in a union, 45 years of age, and with a three-person social
network. Panel B shows that the inclusion of women in social networks has a particularly
strong impact on self-identified strong Democrats. Moving from a network with no
women to a fully female network increases the proportion of Gore voters in the network
by just over 50%. Independents are similarly affected, though the magnitude of the effect
is slightly more than half that size. Finally, we see about a 10% increase among
Republicans. A similar pattern occurs for the Bush proportion of the network. Among
strong Republicans, moving from no females to a network that is entirely female
increases the percentage of Bush support by approximately 20%. There is a positive
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increase among independents, though the substantive effects are quite mild (and
statistically insignificant when computed using Friederich’s formula). And finally, it has
a strong negative effect for Democrats.
It seems apparent that the political composition of networks is not differentiated
solely, or even primarily, by the gender of respondents. It is related to the number of
women in the network, in combination with respondent partisanship. To the extent that
the gender gap in voting is based on cues received in social networks, it would seem that
this comes primarily from the fact that partisanship is related to network composition and
the simple fact that men are more Republican than are women. In other words, we cannot
look at the proportion of men and women in a network to explain gendered voting. For
Republicans, having more women in the network is associated with having more Bush
and Gore supporters; for everyone else, it is associated with having more Gore
supporters.
This implies that discussant gender serves as a way of alerting respondents –
either by accident or on purpose – to how a person fits with their own politics. For men,
having more women in their network jeopardizes their ability to have a supportive
network. This may explain why men's networks exhibit more political homophily in
Tables 2 and 3 -- bring women into the network cuts at the natural tendency of people to
avoid disagreeable political discussants (Festinger 1957). Second – though more subtly
and less strongly – this part of the process is gendered as men and women react
differently. In particular, women are more sensitive to the combined role of partisanship
and gender in screening the Republican parts of their networks while men are more
responsive in the Democratic end.
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Network Structure and Social Influence on Candidate Evaluation
We now turn our attention away from the composition of the network to its
consequences for candidate evaluation. Even when men and women interact and supply
each other with information that should cut at the core of the gender gap, we must also
consider the possibility that this information has little or no consequence when exchanged
between men and women. Therefore, we examine how the impact of men and women as
discussants may be diluted through the distribution of preferences among other
discussants. We do this by estimating an autoregressive model of social influence
outlined in Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) where the unit of analysis here is the
discussant-respondent dyad. As respondents can appear more than one time in the data
set, we correct for correlated errors using robust standard errors for respondent-clusters.
The dependent variable is the change in the respondent’s evaluation of Al Gore and
George Bush from the pre-election survey to the post-election survey, coded so that
positive numbers indicate increasing affection for the two candidates.
The social influence model includes two measures of social influence: (1) the
discussant’s political preference and (2) the amount of agreement with the discussant in
the remainder of the network. We include a control for individual partisanship, the
respondent’s pre-election evaluation of Gore, and an interaction term between discussant
vote and residual candidate support in the network. Unfortunately, our measure of
discussant preferences may itself be a product of the respondent’s preferences, meaning
that our results are subject to endogeneity bias (Kenny 1994). We look to future work to
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use different measures of discussant preferences – such as partisanship, which is a more
stable measure – to attack this issue more directly.5 We estimate the model separately for
1) change in feeling for Gore and Bush and 2) all permutations of respondent and
discussant gender. We specifically look at whether our measures of social influence
depend upon gender homophily in the respondent-discussant dyad.
Interpreting social influence in this model depends on evaluating an interaction
between each discussant's vote preference and the preferences of the rest of the network.
With two candidates, four type of gender-discussant dyads, and four values of the
interacting term (the residual network can have 0, 1, 2, and 3 as possible values), we have
thirty-two different statistical tests to evaluate. As this complicates interpretation, we
report the statistical models in Tables C and D in the Appendix and focus our discussion
on a summary of the statistical results and a graph of coefficient effects. Each coefficient
listed in Table 5 shows the effect of the discussant -- direct influence -- on the change in
feeling towards one of the candidates. There is strong evidence that candidate attitudes
are embedded in social processes, with 20 of 32 of the coefficients obtaining some level
of statistical significance. By itself, this is neither surprising (given previous research) or
that interesting given our focus on gender.
[Table 5 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
We first examine the results of the model of changing attitudes toward Gore.
Here we see that there is significant influence from discussants of each gender to
respondents of each gender. However, that influence is restricted to those networks in
which there are no other Gore discussants or only one. And, as can been seen in Figure
5

The 2000 ANES did not ask respondents for their perceptions of the discussant’s partisanship.
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4, it is in that area where there are the least differences between the different types of
dyads. In other words, there seems to be social influence and it does not seem to be
conditioned by the gender of the respondent or discussant. There are two additional
observations to be made here. First, the impact of any discussant declines as the network
becomes more supportive overall, demonstrating that there are declining returns from
each discussant as the entire network becomes more supportive. Second, the declining
effect of the discussant influence is less steep for same-gender pairs. The effect is not
statistically significant for male-male pairs, but is for female-female pairs (p<.10) with up
to two additional supportive discussants. All in all, the implication is that women and
men seem to place at least slightly more emphasis on their same-gender discussants even
in the context of more political cohesive networks.
A different pattern presents itself when examining feelings towards Bush. There
is still a pattern of diminishing returns in the effect of a Bush-supporting discussant as the
Bush support in the network grows, but it only occurs when men are the discussant. For
men, as their network becomes more pro-Bush they are less likely to weigh the opinion of
their discussants; that is especially true for male-male dyads where the individual
discussant is not important after one other Bush voter is included. A different story
emerges when we consider female discussants. For men, there are no meaningful
"declining effects." If the network has no other discussants backing Bush or only one
other, that single female Bush supporter has a strong positive effect on evaluations of
both. If the respondent is a woman, having more Bush-supporting networks actually
increases the impact of a pro-Bush female discussant.
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Our interpretation of these complicated results is relatively straightforward.
When women act according to the stereotype that they are more Democratic than men,
their impact on candidate attitudes is in some sense unremarkable -- it is the same as any
other discussant. However, when they act "out of character," they have an opportunity to
exert significant influence. In those cases, it is because the socially-supplied information
is more informative and novel, that it is more impactful. All in all, this story does not
seem to be about gender and politics alone, but about their combined impact.
We are hesitant to draw strong conclusions about causality on the basis of this
evidence, as endogenous influence and network selection serve as potential sources of
statistical biases. However, the evidence is consistent with the argument that gender is
important for understanding how much influence a discussant will have on a respondent’s
view of the candidates. The most consistent pattern we see is that females can influence
people, but it is only under highly defined conditions. Otherwise, the social influence
process in this case seems more related to the composition of networks.
Summary and Discussion
Overall, our results suggest that gendered patterns of social communication and
network structure do play a role in contributing to the gender gap, though this role is far
from simple. Given Berelson’s remarks, this makes sense. Women are in substantial
contact with men. Despite persistent differences among the sexes, they are not strictly
separated according to any religious or other social institution that prohibit interaction.
Further, we do not see the strong partisan divides between men and women that we see,
for example, between African-Americans and whites. However, it is fairly evident from
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our analysis that social communication is shaped by gender to some extent, most likely in
combination with expected factors such as partisanship.
In terms of network structure, we find that discussant gender and partisanship are
working together in order to influence respondents. For instance, we do not find that
women are opting into all Democratic networks or that men are opting into all
Republican networks. Rather, gender and partisanship are working together, though their
influence may be different on male and female respondents. Gender homophily appears
to be related to partisan messages as well. For men, gender may be functioning as a cue
for agreement more so than for women. We find that men are less likely to include
women in their networks, and when they do, they are more discriminating about the
women they let into their networks. Strong partisans, in particular, are very selective
about the women they include in their networks.
When examining discussant influence, we find that gender similarity of networks
matters more for women than men. This is probably due to that fact that, as mentioned
previously, men are heavily screening the women they let into their networks. On the
other hand, effects of discussant knowledge do not appear to be gendered although this
must be interpreted cautiously due to men’s devaluation of women’s political knowledge.
Previous research on the gender gap indicates there is no simple explanation, but
multiple, interrelated causes. When examining the underlying foundations of social
communication that might be contributing to this phenomenon, we find similar results in
terms of complexity. While gendered patterns of communication appear to be
contributing to the gender gap, they are certainly not the only factor affecting social
communication between men and women.
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Figure 1. Possible Effects of Gender and Social Networks on Voting Behavior.
Source of
Effect

Social Networks

Gendering in Social Networks
Composition

Political
preferences

The respondent’s vote
is likely to correlate
with the average
network vote.

Communication

Women are more
Democratic than men
and therefore have
more Democrats in
their network.
Women who have
more women in their
network will have
more Democrats as
well.

Structure of
network

The influence of a
disagreeing discussant
is dependent on the
remainder of the
network.

The impact of female
discussants on males
depends more heavily
on the rest of the
network.
The impact of female
discussants on female
respondents will
depend less on the rest
of the network.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Full Social Networks by Gender.
Panel A. All Respondents.

Network Property

Respondent Gender
Male
Mean
Std. Dev.

Difference

Female
Mean
Std. Dev.

Size

1.72

1.55

1.51

1.49

0.21*

Political Talk

1.34

1.07

1.24

1.08

0.11*

Political Knowledge

0.81

0.72

0.80

0.74

0.01

Gore Support

0.25

0.37

0.24

0.38

0.01

Bush Support

0.29

0.39

0.24

0.38

0.05*

Gender

0.22

0.31

0.31

0.37 -0.09*

Network Intimacy

0.25

0.37

0.32

0.40 -0.07*

*p<.05, two-tailed test
Panel B. Respondents Naming At Least One Discussant.

Network Property

Respondent Gender
Male
Mean
Std. Dev.

Difference

Female
Mean
Std. Dev.

Size

2.61

1.15

2.43

1.15 .18*

Political Talk

2.04

0.56

1.99

0.61 .05

Political Knowledge

1.23

0.52

1.29

0.51 -.06

Gore Support

0.41

0.39

0.42

0.41 -.01

Bush Support

0.47

0.40

0.42

0.42 .05

Gender

0.33

0.33

0.50

0.36

Intimacy

0.38

0.40

0.52

0.40 -.14*

*p<.05, two-tailed test
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-.16*

Table 2. Discussant Political Preferences by Respondent and Discussant Gender.

Female Respondents
Discussant vote

Female
Discussant

Male
Discussant

Male Respondents
Female
Discussant

Male
Discussant

Percent Gore

47.6%
(344)

36.1%
(250)

48.6%
(206)

34.5%
(284)

Percent Bush

39.6%
(286)

45.2%
(313)

38.7%
(164)

52.7%
(434)

12.8%
(93)

18.6%
(129)

12.7%
(54)

12.8%
(106)

Percent Other /
None
Total

100%
(723)

100%
(692)

100%
(424)

29

100%
(824)

Table 3. Discussant Vote Choice by Respondent Vote, Respondent Gender, and
Discussant Gender.

Respondent Vote Choice
Discussant Vote Choice

Gore

Bush

Panel A. Male Respondent / Male Discussant
Percent Gore 61.8%
Percent Bush 28.2%
Percent Other 10.0%

17.1%
73.6%
9.3%

Panel B. Male Respondent / Female Discussant
Percent Gore 77.7%
Percent Bush 11.2%
Percent Other 11.1%

20.7%
72.2%
7.1%

Panel C. Female Respondent / Male Discussant
Percent Gore 57.6%
Percent Bush 24.8%
Percent Other 17.5%

16.7%
75.3%
8.0%

Panel D. Female Respondent / Female Discussant
Percent Gore 66.7%
Percent Bush 22.2%
Percent Other 11.1%

24.3%
67.6%
8.1%
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Figure 2. The Effect of Gender Composition on the Political Composition of Social
Networks for Men and Women.
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Figure 3.. Candidate Support as a Function of Network Gender and Partisanship.
Panel A.. Support for Bush Among the Respondent’s Discussants.

Panel B.. Support for Gore among the Respondent’s Discussants.
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Table 4. The Effect of Respondent Partisanship and Network Gender Composition
on Network Political Composition, OLS Regression.

Percent of Network
Supporting Gore

Variables
Female

Coef. S.E.

Coef. S.E.

-0.01 0.02

-0.01 0.02

Education
Age
Union Member
Married

Percent of Network
Supporting Bush

0.01 0.00*

0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.07 0.02**

0.02 0.02

-0.02 0.02

0.04 0.02**

Partisanship

0.03 0.00**

-0.05 0.00**

Network Size

0.07 0.01**

0.11 0.01**

Network Gender

0.34 0.04**

0.03 0.04

Female * Network Gender

-0.08 0.04
0.08 0.01**

Partisanship* Network Gender
Constant

-0.06 0.05

N 1595
F
97.32**
2
R
0.38
Root MSE
0.29

0.05 0.05
-0.06 0.01**
0.01 0.05
1595
101.30**
0.39
0.30

*p<.05, two-tailed, **p<.01, two-tailed
Dependent Variable: Average support for candidate in the network, all respondents.
Note: If a coefficient did not attain statistical significance, we rounded to two decimal
places. If a coefficient attained statistical significance, we rounded to the highest
possible decimal place up to two digits.
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Table 5. Coefficients, T-Values, and Statistical Significances for Discussant Vote
Based on Residual Network Support and Dyad Gender Homophily.
Dyad

Residual Coefficient
support

T-value

Statistical Significance
p<.01

Change in Gore Feeling Thermometer
Male Respondent,
0
1
Male Discussant
2
3
Male Respondent,
0
Female Discussant
1
2
3
0
Female
Respondent, Male
1
2
Discussant
3
0
Female
1
Respondent,
2
Female Discussant
3

9.61
6.39
3.17
-0.05
9.53
4.69
-0.15
-4.99
9.00
4.53
0.06
-4.41
7.67
6.46
5.25
4.04

3.90
4.23
1.36
0.01
2.84
2.06
0.04
0.78
3.51
2.49
0.02
1.07
3.14
3.82
1.89
0.80

Change in Bush Feeling Thermometer
Male Respondent,
0
Male Discussant
1
2
3
Male Respondent,
0
1
Female Discussant
2
3
Female
0
1
Respondent, Male
Discussant
2
3
Female
0
Respondent,
1
2
Female Discussant
3

5.20
2.90
0.60
-1.70
8.27
8.01
7.75
7.49
5.69
4.36
3.03
1.70
8.78
9.93
11.08
12.23

2.01
1.88
0.26
0.43
2.17
3.05
2.46
1.54
2.15
2.45
1.18
0.41
2.91
5.06
4.28
2.91
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p<.05

p<.10

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Figure 4. Impact of Discussant on Change in Gore and Bush Feeling Thermometors
based on Residual Support for the Discussant's Candidate Choice in the Network.
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Appendix
Table A. Variable Descriptions and Statistics for Respondent-Level Data Set.

Variable

Description

N
1650

Min,
Max
0, 1

Percent
Supporting
Gore

% of network discussants R
believed voted for Gore

Percent
Supporting
Bush

0.25

Std.
Dev.
0.37

% of network discussants R
believed voted for Gore

1650

0, 1

0.26

0.38

Female

1=woman, 0=man

1807

0, 1

0.56

0.50

Education

Highest grade completed
(17=17 or more)

1795

2, 17

13.64

2.31

Age

Respondent self-reported age
(97=97 or older)

1798

18, 97

47.21

16.96

Union
Member

Respondent self-reported
member of union.

1795

0, 1

0.14

0.45

Married

Currently married.

1793

0, 1

0.52

0.50

Partisanship

Self-reported partisanship (-1
= Republican, 0 =
Independent, 1 = Democrat)

1771

-1, 1

0.09

0.77

Network
Size

Number of discussants named
by R

1807

0, 4

1.59

1.52

Network
Gender

% of network that are female

1800

0, 1

0.27

0.35
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Mean

Table B. Variable Descriptions and Statistics for Dyad-Level Data Set.

Variable

Description

N

Min,
Max
-100,
100

Mean
-2.26

Std.
Dev.
29.24

Change in
Gore Post-Election Feeling Feeling
Gore Pre-Election Feeling
Thermometer Thermometer
(Gore)

2863

Change in
Bush Post-Election Feeling Feeling
Bush Pre-Election Feeling
Thermometer Thermometer
(Bush)

2870

-100,
100

0.92

31.39

Pre-Election
Feeling
Thermometer
(Gore)

2875

0, 100

56.11

25.98

Pre-Election
Feeling
Thermometer
(Bush)

2875

0, 100

55.62

26.30

Discussant
Vote (Gore)

Respondent reported that
Discussant voted for Gore

2664

0, 1

0.41

0.49

Discussant
Vote (Bush)

Respondent reported that
Discussant voted for Bush

2664

0, 1

0.45

0.50

Residual
Support
(Gore)

Number of other discussants
supporting Gore in network.

2432

0, 3

0.80

0.91

Residual
Support
(Bush)

Number of other discussants
supporting Bush in network.

2432

0, 3

0.92

0.99
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Table C. Effect of Discussant Vote Choice on Respondent Evaluation of Gore by Respondent and Discussant Gender, OLS
Regression with Clustered Standard Errors.

Female Respondent

Male Respondent
Male Discussant

Female Discussant

Male Discussant

Female Discussant

Coef. Std. Error

Coef. Std. Error

Coef. Std. Error

Coef. Std. Error

Partisanship

7.01 0.60***

6.79 0.90***

6.16 0.66***

8.89 0.61***

Discussant Gore Vote

7.61 2.46***

9.53 3.35***

9.00 2.56***

7.67 2.44***

Partisanship x Discussant
Residual Gore Support
Discussant Vote x Residual
Pre-Election Thermometer
Constant

N
F-test
R2
Root MSE
*p<.10, two-tailed test

-0.69 0.83
4.06 1.59**

-0.21 1.09
7.44 2.77***

0.14 0.91
5.83 1.39***

-1.64 0.78**
2.38 1.55

-3.22 1.68*

-5.84 2.86**

-4.47 1.83**

-1.21 2.00

-0.72 0.03***

-0.76 0.05***

-0.76 0.04***

-0.84 0.03***

31.48 31.48

31.75 3.38

34.72 2.67***

41.59 2.55***

737
109.22***
0.55
19.21
**p<.05, two-tailed test

379
54.95***
0.59
19.21
***p<.01, two-tailed test
38

626
86.01***
0.57
18.76

639
192.06***
0.66
18.51

Table D. Effect of Discussant Vote Choice on Respondent Evaluation of Bush by Respondent and Discussant Gender, OLS
Regression with Clustered Standard Errors.

Female Respondent

Male Respondent
Male Discussant

Partisanship
Discussant Bush Vote
Partisanship x Discussant
Residual Bush Support

Female Discussant

Male Discussant

Female Discussant

Coef. Std. Error

Coef. Std. Error

Coef. Std. Error

Coef. Std. Error

-5.81 0.71***

-5.22 0.89***

-6.49 0.72***

-7.06 0.83***

5.20 2.59**

8.26 3.80**

5.69 2.64**

8.78 3.02***

-1.15 0.87
4.90 1.51***

-1.49 1.35
4.34 1.64***

-0.08 0.88

-1.02 1.04

4.42 1.57***

3.93 1.68**

1.33 1.90

1.15 2.01

-2.30 1.90

-0.26 2.30

Pre-Election Thermometer

-0.78 0.03***

-0.82 0.05***

-0.77 0.03***

-0.87 0.03***

Constant

39.57 2.67***

39.84 3.37***

37.34 2.62***

41.40 2.76

Discussant Vote x Residual

N
F-test
R2
Root MSE
*p<.10, two-tailed test

741
134.82***
0.64
17.53
**p<.05, two-tailed test

379
66.84***
0.64
18.36
***p<.01, two-tailed test
39

626
101.56***
0.58
20.55

636
210.40***
0.68
20.18

